The core problem: accession is not the finish line
Accepting an international convention does not by itself mean it is implemented effectively. Between a treaty obligation and performance that can be demonstrated lies a chain of legislation, allocation of responsibility, budget, procedures, oversight, record-keeping and continuous improvement. The Code for the Implementation of IMO Instruments, known as the III Code and adopted by Resolution A.1070(28), examines that chain as a whole. Since 1 January 2016 the IMO Member State Audit Scheme, IMSAS, has been mandatory for the instruments it covers. It is therefore better to use the III Code as an architecture for the maritime administration rather than as a checklist for the night before an audit.
Three roles of the State and one shared problem
The flag State must ensure that requirements are applied to the ships flying its flag; the coastal State has duties that match its jurisdiction in each maritime zone; and the port State exercises control over foreign ships that fall within scope. These roles are not necessarily held by three separate organisations. The main risk is a blurred line of accountability between technical, legal, inspection, ship registration, search and rescue and environmental units. The State’s responsibility does not disappear when some tasks are delegated to recognised organisations (ROs).
How to identify implementation gaps
A practical approach is to set up an obligations register. For each requirement, record the instrument, the regulation or article, its scope, the State’s acceptance status and the date of application. Then identify the accountable unit, the legal basis for its powers, the working procedure, the type of evidence that shows implementation and the monitoring indicator. A lack of documents does not always mean a lack of activity, but from a governance point of view an activity that cannot be traced and assessed is not enough to manage risk. Rank findings by severity of risk, urgency, effect on safety and capacity to correct them.
A decision example: the recognised organisation
Suppose the technical surveys of ships have been delegated to an RO, but the maritime administration has no programme of oversight visits, no performance review and no feedback mechanism. The answer is not simply to renew the agreement or ask for more reports. The delegated powers, performance standards, right of access to files, periodic audits and corrective actions must all be defined. At management level, the desired output is an RO oversight matrix with a named process owner.
A suggested 90-day and one-year roadmap
In the first 30 days, list the binding instruments and the owner of each; by day 60, assess the high-risk gaps and the evidence available; by day 90, approve a corrective action package, a RACI and indicators. Over one year, embed a system for managing amendments, a training programme for inspectors, data quality control and internal audit. This timetable is a suggested management model, not an official IMO deadline. Success is measured by fewer repeat findings, corrective actions that are closed, and processes that work.
A sample matrix for reporting to senior management
| Area reviewed | Main evidence | Management question | Suggested output |
|---|---|---|---|
| Translating obligations into national rules | Valid laws and procedures | Is the power to implement the obligation clear? | A regulatory reform map |
| Flag State oversight | Survey files, certificates and RO oversight | Does the State know how well delegated tasks are performed? | An oversight plan and effectiveness tests |
| Port State control | Procedures, inspector qualifications and deficiency reports | Are decisions documented and proportionate? | A file audit and targeted training |
| Monitoring and correction | Internal audit reports and CAP records | Has a recurring deficiency really been brought under control? | A corrective action dashboard |
This matrix is an example of how to organise the work. It must be checked against the full text of the III Code, the instruments covered by the audit and national law. In particular, responsibilities should not exist only on the organisation chart: evidence that a duty has been performed must be retrievable from real systems and files. A corrective action is not closed until its effectiveness has been confirmed; closing a file administratively is not the same as reducing the actual risk.
Key indicators worth monitoring
Three initial indicators can be defined for management reporting: the share of obligations that have an owner and valid evidence, the percentage of corrective actions confirmed as effective, and the recurrence rate of high-severity findings. For each indicator the denominator and reporting period must stay fixed, so that an apparent improvement caused by a change in recording practice is not mistaken for real improvement. When managers change, the transfer of responsibility and access to records should also be covered by change control.
Practical checklist
- Record the requirement, the article and the date of entry into force for every applicable convention
- Name an accountable owner and the evidence that can be shown for each duty
- Separate direct State control from oversight of delegated tasks
- Prioritise findings by risk and by how readily they can be corrected
Frequently asked questions
Is the III Code only an audit standard?
No. As well as being the basis of the audit, the III Code can be used to design an implementation system and to measure how effectively obligations are met.
Does a recognised organisation take over the flag State's responsibility completely?
No. Delegating operations does not remove the flag State's duty of oversight or its accountability.
Related advisory area: International Maritime Regulation & IMO Affairs
Editorial note: this article is written for awareness and management decision-making. Applying any rule depends on the authentic current text, the legal position of the State concerned and the facts of the case. The content is independent and implies no endorsement by, or affiliation with, IMO.